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The convex pay-off structure of executive stock options (ESO) incentivizes CEOs 
to increase their firm stock-return volatility, thereby increasing their wealth in option 
portfolio. In this paper, I address two research questions. I first test if this managerial 
incentive induces executives to take on more risky projects in R&D that increases stock-
return volatility, hence, boosting their personal wealth. I derive vega to measure 
managerial incentive, and vega is a dollar change in ESO for a 0.01 change in stock-
return volatility. I find that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between vega and R&D investment, which suggests that managers whose wealth is 
closely tied to stock options are more incentivized to invest in risky R&D projects to 
increase their wealth and stock-return volatility. This result is statistically significant and 
robust after adjusting for inflation and controlling for firm and industry-fixed effects. 
With this finding, I proceed to test if managerial risk-taking incentive for R&D 
investments translate to future earnings. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) establish that future 
earnings is a function of both tangible and intangible assets, and R&D increases with 
firm’s subsequent earnings. Since R&D spending changes with managerial incentive, I 
test if the interactive variable of vega and R&D has a positive effect on firm’s future 
earnings. I find that managerial incentive for undertaking R&D investments has a 
positive and statistically significant association with future earnings under industry-fixed 
effects specifications. When controlling for firm-fixed effects, the result yielded similar 
results to that of industry-fixed effects, but with less statistical significance. Lastly, for 
robustness check, I run the regression with a balanced panel data of tenured-CEOs, who 
stay with the firm for five years. I find that the result is positive and statistically 
significant for industry-fixed effects. However, for firm-fixed effects, I only find 
statistical significance at year t+k (k=3). This suggests that the realization of R&D 
investment to future earnings is not prevalent throughout all years when R&D decisions 
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I. Introduction  
 
Traditional compensation policy in salary, bonus, and stock incentivizes managers 
to be more risk-averse and turn down risk-increasing projects. Nowadays, more 
executives are compensated in executive stock options (ESO), which addresses agency 
problems and encourage risk-averse managers to invest in high-risk high-reward projects 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The convex payoff structure of stock options allows the 
option value to increase with stock-return volatility, and Cohen et al. (2000) find that as 
managers increase their option holdings, they are more incentivized to take actions that 
increase subsequent firm risk. This result supports the theory established by Guay (1999), 
in which he claims that as manager’s wealth is more sensitive to stock-return volatility, 
the manager is more incentivized to engage in investment and financing decisions. This 
sensitivity measurement is denoted as vega, which measures the managerial incentive to 
take on risks. 
This paper attempts to address two research questions. I first examine how 
managerial incentive for taking on risky projects associates with R&D spending. Existing 
literature has established that managers with ESO are more incentivized to increase 
equity volatility, and one of the ways to do so is by investing in risky projects (Coles et 
al., 2006). I test if managerial incentive increases with R&D expenditures, which is 
considered to be riskier than investments in property, plant, and equipment (Coles et al., 
2006). I expand the existing literature by testing if the association between R&D and 
managerial incentive continues to be positive for a broad sample of 2,276 firms from 
various industries, over a more recent time period of 1992 to 2018. 
I obtain all the data from Wharton Research Data Services. I use Compustat, 
Execucomp, and CRSP. I follow the study done by Coles et al. (2006) that calculates the 
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dollar value of vega and delta from 1992 to 2002, controlling for firm and industry-fixed 
effects. Delta is the ESO slope effect, which explains a manager’s incentive to take on 
positive NPV projects that increase equity price (Rajgopal and Shelvin, 2002). I take 
methodology of Coles et al. (2006) and derive CEO’s vega and delta from 1992 to 2018. 
With these values, I regress R&D spending, scaled by total assets, with respect to vega 
and control for delta and firm characteristics such as capital expenditures, size, leverage, 
Tobin’s Q, sales growth, and free cash flow level. I find that manager’s incentive for risk-
taking increases with R&D intensity. In other words, managers who hold ESOs are more 
incentivized to take on R&D projects to raise firm volatility, hence, increasing their 
wealth in options. This positive relationship is highly statistically significant but yielded 
small economic significance. The result, however, still remained robust, even after 
adjusting vega and delta to the price-level in 2018.  
After establishing this association, I conduct a second study to analyze if a 
manager’s incentive for taking on projects in R&D translate to increase in future 
earnings. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Sougiannis (1994) find that R&D investments 
are positively correlated with subsequent earnings, and from my first research question, I 
establish that managerial incentive for risk increases with R&D spending. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the interactive variable of R&D and vega, which measures manager’s 
incentive for risk-taking specifically on R&D projects, would positively affect future 
earnings. To my knowledge, this has not been explicitly addressed by previous studies. 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) predict subsequent earnings by only including R&D, and 
Hanlon et al. (2003) include the dollar value of ESO, which does not factor in manager’s 
incentive on investment decisions. Therefore, I expand from the previous literatures by 
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adding in the interactive variable of vega and R&D, which captures managerial incentive 
for R&D projects.  
Operating income of a firm is a production function of both tangible and 
intangible assets (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Hanlon et al., 2003). Therefore, I 
regress operating income at t+k (k= 0 – 5) on tangible assets that include inventories and 
property, plant, and equipment and intangible assets that include R&D spending, vega, 
and interactive variable of R&D and vega. All variables but vega are scaled by total 
assets, and all variables but operating income are lagged by one year. I run two separate 
regressions, respectively controlling for firm and industry-fixed effects. For robustness 
check, I correct for survivorship bias and run the model on a balanced panel data of 
tenured-CEOs, a selective group of long-standing CEOs who stay with the firm for five 
years.1 By doing so, I also test how tenured-CEOs’ incentive for taking on R&D projects 
translate to future earnings, specifically narrowing my focus to CEOs who shepherd the 
R&D investment until the future earnings are realized.   
When I run this regression on a balanced panel data, controlling for firm and 
industry-fixed effects, I find that managerial incentive for R&D investment increases 
firm’s future earnings. Put differently, a manager’s decision to increase firm volatility by 
undertaking R&D projects, not only leads to an increase in personal wealth but also 
firm’s earnings. Specifically, when controlled for industry-fixed effects, I discover this 
relationship to be statistically significant for all years t+k (k = 0 – 5). However, when 
controlling for firm-fixed effect, statistical significance is only shown at year t+3. This 
result suggests that long-standing executives’ incentive for R&D projects translates to 
                                                        
1 Equilar Inc. (2018) published a study that shows five-year is an average tenure for CEOs at S&P 500 
companies. 
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significant increase in future earnings, three years after their investment. It also implies 
that stock-return volatility does not incentivize tenured-CEOs decision on R&D 
investments, and perhaps they use R&D investments only as a means to increase their 
own personal wealth. This implication is supported by the negative and statistically 
significant result of the vega coefficients for years t+k (k = 2 – 5).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related 
literature. Section III develops my research hypotheses. Section IV discusses the data and 
methodology for deriving vega and delta. Section V presents empirical strategy and 
results. The conclusions are presented in Section VI.  
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II. Literature review  
 
Early research shows that R&D investments are positively correlated with 
subsequent earnings (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Sougiannis 1994). However, Porter 
(1992) finds that sometimes managers cut R&D investments to meet short-term earnings 
goals, instead of creating a long-term corporate value. The U.S. corporate system puts 
responsibility on firms to maximize shareholder value, and Porter (1992) argues that this 
environment predominantly pressures managements to sacrifice R&D investments in 
order to maintain short-term earnings and stock performance goals. This investment 
decision behavior is called “managerial myopia,” where managers underinvest in long-
term intangible projects such as R&D, advertising, and employee training, for the 
purposes of meeting short-term goals (Porter, 1992). Investors cannot see beyond the 
current earnings, and this myopic view leads managers to avoid investments with long-
term payouts, believing that such spending will reduce short-term earnings and stock 
prices. Dechow and Sloan (1991) confirm this behavior especially for CEOs during their 
final year in executive positions — CEOs invest less in R&D projects during their final 
term. However, this myopic investment decision is mitigated when companies have a 
high percentage of institutional ownership. Bushee (1998) finds that these sophisticated 
institutional investors actually encourage companies to focus on driving long-term values 
through investments in R&D rather than immediate short-term gains. 
However, for companies that face declines in earnings, investment in R&D could 
actually help them. Chan et al. (1990) discover that when companies make new R&D 
project announcements, the market positively incorporates this new information into their 
stock prices. This reaction suggests that investors also positively view R&D as a long-
term value-creating investment, which encourages them to look further beyond the short-
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term earnings and myopic investment horizon. Chan et al. (1990) find that this behavior, 
however, only applies to technologically mature companies. They conclude that for low-
technologically mature companies, the market reacts negatively when they announce 
R&D expenditures. This result indicates that R&D spending matters differently for each 
industry and the maturity of each company. Johnson and Pazderka (1993) also confirm 
this association with companies listed on the Canadian stock market. 
Managers are primarily incentivized to make decisions that maximize 
shareholders’ value and meet earnings expectations. However, when executives get 
compensated through stock options, they also make decisions that increase their wealth. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find this relation to be true by testing the association 
between employee stock options and earnings manipulation. They find that CEOs use 
discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings when their potential total 
compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Put differently, 
earnings management is more prevalent at firms that have incentivized CEOs, whose 
compensation is sensitive to companies’ share prices. Ali and Zhang (2015) discover that 
CEOs are more incentivized to manage earnings in their earlier years when the market 
perception is more uncertain. They find that, on average, CEOs use discretionary accruals 
like R&D expenses to overstate returns on assets by 25% in earlier years of their CEO 
terms (Ali and Zhang, 2015). However, for firms that have strong internal and external 
monitoring through board and audit committee independence, this difference in earnings 
overstatement is less pronounced.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that stock option compensation policy allows 
shareholders to reduce agency conflict with managers and encourages executives to take 
actions which increase equity value. Option value increases with volatility, and Cohen et 
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al. (2000) find that managers who hold executive stock options are more incentivized to 
take actions that increase firm risk. They find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between increase in option holdings and subsequent firm risk. Guay (1999) 
claims that the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to the volatility of the equity value 
significantly affects managerial decision for investment and financing choices. This 
sensitivity is called vega, which measures the change in option portfolio value for a 0.01 
change in stock-return volatility. Core and Guay (2002) establish an easy-to-implement 
alternative method to compute managerial incentives by taking a partial derivative of the 
Black-Scholes option value with respect to stock price. By doing so, they also define 
delta, which is the changes in the dollar value of executive stock options for a one 
percentage change in stock price. Unlike Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) who 
define vega and delta from partial derivatives, Rajgopal and Shelvin (2002) assert that 
delta explains a manager’s incentive to take on positive NPV projects that increase equity 
price, whereas vega measures managerial incentive to increase stock return volatility by 
becoming involved in risky projects.  
Managerial incentives also have an effect on future operating income. Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) predict subsequent earnings by defining operating income as a 
production function of tangible and intangible assets. Hanlon et al. (2003) follow this 
methodology and estimate the link between future operating income and the Black-
Scholes value of ESO grants to the top five executives. They test to see if the association 
between future earnings and ESO grants given to the top five executives explains 
executives’ investment alignment and option granting behavior. Their results show that a 
dollar of Black-Scholes value of an ESO grant is associated with future operating income 
by $3.71.  
  8 
In this paper, I address if the managerial incentive for taking on R&D projects 
translates to future earnings. I expand the existing literature by adding managerial 
incentive into the earnings function. To account for intangible assets, Lev and Sougiannis 
(1996) include R&D, and Hanlon et al. (2003) add the dollar value of ESO, which does 
not capture managerial incentive on investment decisions. However, I include the 
sensitivity of the value of ESO on stock return-volatility (vega), R&D, and the interactive 
variable of vega and R&D to factor in the effects that managerial incentive has on R&D 
investments.  
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III. Hypotheses 
 
1. Relationship between R&D spending and Vega  
As Guay (1999) establishes, the convex payoff structure of options makes the 
value of a manager’s stock option portfolio increase with the firm’s volatility on stock-
returns. Executives can increase stock-return volatility by taking on risky projects or 
increasing firm leverage, and generally R&D investments are considered high-risk 
investments compared to capital expenditures on property plant and equipment (Coles et 
al. 2006). Coles et al. (2006) find a strong causal link between managerial compensation 
and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. They conclude that high sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock-return volatility induces managerial choice to take on more and 
higher leverage and invest less in property, plant, and equipment. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, as the sensitivity of executive’s stock option portfolio to stock 
return volatility (vega) increases, managers take on more risky projects such as R&D.  
 
2. Relationship between future earnings, Vega, and R&D  
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) establish that R&D investments are positively 
associated with subsequent earnings. Future earnings can be derived by a production 
function of tangible and intangible assets (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Hanlon et al., 
2003). R&D is included as intangible assets, but R&D can change with managerial 
incentive when executives get ESO compensation. Hanlon et al. (2003) find that ESO 
compensation has a positive effect on future operating income. They test to see if the 
association between ESO grants given to the top five executives and future earnings 
explains the executives’ investment alignment and option granting behavior. They find 
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that, on average, a dollar of Black-Scholes value of an ESO grant is associated with 
future operating income by $3.71. However, they test in dollar value terms, which does 
not incorporate managerial incentive. Therefore, by including vega, I assess if managerial 
incentive for risk-taking in R&D projects associates with future earnings. I hypothesize 
that: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the interaction of vega and R&D spending has positive 
relationship with future operating income and has explanatory power in predicting 
future operating income.  
I expect to find a positive and statistical relationship for the following reasons. 
First, vega measures managerial incentive for increasing firm risk, and managers can 
increase volatility by taking on risky projects. R&D projects are high-risk and high-return 
projects, and their payouts are in the long-term. Therefore, when managers choose to 
invest in risky R&D projects, I hypothesize that they make this decision with an 
expectation that R&D investment would increase both firm risk and future earnings. For 
this reason, I expect that managerial incentive for undertaking R&D investments 
positively affects future earnings to be realized.    
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IV. Data  
 
I obtain all the data from Wharton Research Data Services. I use Compustat, 
Execucomp, and CRSP. Compustat provides firm-level annual financial statement data; 
Execucomp compiles annual salary, bonus, and total compensation for the top five 
executives; and CRSP database offers monthly historical stock prices.  
 The sample includes current CEOs’ stock option compensations and firm-specific 
financial data for fiscal years 1992-2018. I restrict my analysis to only current CEOs 
because I assume that managerial decisions for R&D investment is made at the CEO-
level. Moreover, the top five executives change year to year, since they are ranked 
annually by salary and bonus. Therefore, even if I assume that R&D investment is 
collectively decided by the top five executive-level, for consistency, I restrict my data to 
only CEO-level.  
 Execucomp changed its data reporting format in 2006, which reflected new 
accounting changes made by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and 
additional equity-based compensation disclosures imposed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). For this reason, derivation for vega and delta is different 
for pre and post-2006.  
 
1. Derivation for vega and delta 
Vega measures pay-performance sensitivity in manager’s stock option portfolio 
for a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility. It numerically quantifies manager’s incentive 
to increase stock-return volatility. To calculate vega, I follow Guay (1999), Core and 
Guay (2002), and Coles et al. (2006) methodologies, which use Black-Scholes (1973) 
option pricing model with a modification made by Merton (1973) that includes 
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dividends.2 Black-Scholes formula for valuing call options with Merton (1973)’s 
modification is as follows:  
               Option value = [𝑆𝑒$%&𝑁(𝑍) − 𝑋𝑒$-&𝑁.𝑍 − 𝜎𝑇(1/3)4]                        (1) 
where Z is 6ln	(𝑆/𝑋) + 𝑇 ;𝑟 − 𝑑 + s>3 ?@ /.𝜎𝑇(1 3⁄ )4, N is the cumulative probability 
function for normal distribution; S is the price of underlying strike; X is the exercise price 
of the stock option;  𝜎 is the estimated stock-return volatility over the option maturity; r 
is the risk-free rate; T is the time to maturity of the option in years; and d is the expected 
dividend rate over the life of the option.   
To compute vega, I take partial derivative of the option value with respect to 0.01 
change in stock-return volatility as follows:   
B(CDEFGH	IJKLM)B(NEGOP	IGKJEFKFEQ)´0.01 = 	 𝑒$%E𝑁V(𝑍)𝑆𝑇(1/3)´0.01                     (2) 
where 𝑁V is a normal density function and all other variables are as previously defined.  
 Delta measures pay-performance price sensitivity, which is a change in dollar 
value of executive’s stock option for a one percentage point change in stock price. I take 
partial derivative of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price:  
B(CDEFGH	IJKLM)B(NEGOP	D-FOM) ´ D-FOM1WW 	= 	 𝑒$%E𝑁(𝑍)´ XYZ[\1WW                                      (3) 
where N is a normal density function and all other variables are as previously defined.    
To compute the pay-performance sensitivity, I need the following inputs from 
Execucomp to first calculate the Black-Scholes option value: number of vested and 
unvested option awards, exercise price, expiration date of option, and stock price at fiscal 
year-end. I estimate stock-return volatility and dividend yield, using Coles et al. (2006) 
                                                        
2 For detailed explanation on how to compute vega and delta using Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP, 
refer to Coles et al. (2013).  
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methodology. I retrieve data for historical risk-free rates from the Federal Reserve 
website and correspond to the maturity of the options. 
 The major difference between the pre and post-2006 reporting is the absence of 
tranche-level details for previous years’ option grants. Starting from 2006, Execucomp 
provides information for each outstanding option tranche such as the number of vested, 
number of unvested, and unearned options. It also provides the exercise price and 
expiration date for each corresponding option tranche. All this information is 
conveniently located in one dataset called “Compustat Executive Compensation – 
Outstanding Equity Awards.” However, for periods before 2006, the primary database 
(Company Financial and Director Compensation) only offers details for current year 
outstanding options.  The exercise price and the expiration date are provided from 
different datasets: 1) Stock Option Grants and 2) Annual Compensation. For this reason, 
to calculate vega and delta for pre-2006, I merge three different datasets: Company 
Financial and Director Compensation, Stock Option Grants, and Annual Compensation, 
and I estimate the vested and unvested option values that exclude current year option 
grants.  
 For post-2006, calculating vega and delta is simply inputting the corresponding 
variables to the Black-Scholes option model then taking a partial derivative with respect 
to either stock-return volatility or stock price. All the information is given in the dataset 
except stock-return volatility, dividend yield, and risk-free rates. As of 2006, Execucomp 
discontinued providing stock- return volatility. I follow methodologies of Execucomp 
and Coles et al. (2006) and use annualized standard deviation of the historical monthly 
stock returns, which is estimated 60 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal period. 
For samples that have less than 12 months of data, I take the mean volatility. Finally, I 
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winsorize the volatility estimates at the 5th and 95th percentile levels. Execucomp also 
stopped providing dividend yield as of 2006. Similar to how I estimate stock-return 
volatility, I estimate the dividend yield using the same methodology from Execucomp 
and Coles et al. (2006). I take average of the current and two prior years of dividend yield 
and winsorize it at the 5th and 95th levels. For risk-free rates, I obtain data from the 
Federal Reserve website, which offers sample points for one, two, three, five, seven, and 
ten-year Treasury securities. For four, six, eight, and nine-year Treasury securities, I 
follow Coles et al. (2006) and interpolate the rates. For maturities that are more than ten-
years, I use the ten-year rate.  
 For pre-2006 samples, I use the same approximation method for post-2006. 
However, because detailed information is only provided for the current year option 
tranche and not for options from previous years, I estimate values using methodology 
from Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006).3 To compute the number of 
previously granted unvested options, Coles et al. (2006) estimate unvested number of 
options excluding current year by subtracting the number of options granted in the 
current year from the number of unvested options. 
Lastly, when estimating maturity for these previously granted unvested options, I 
follow Coles et al. (2006) methodology by subtracting one from the maturity year of 
current year options grants. For options that do not have current year grants, I assume the 
average maturity of these previously granted unvested options to be nine years. 
Following Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006), I compute the maturity of 
vested options by subtracting three years from the maturity of unvested options.  
                                                        
3 For detailed explanation on how to compute vega and delta using Compustat, Execucomp, and CRSP, 
refer to Coles et al. (2013). 
  15 
 Using all these inputs, vega is the sum of current year options vega and vega of 
previously-granted vested and unvested options.  Likewise, delta is estimated by 
summing the delta of current year options, the delta of the portfolio of previously-granted 
unvested and vested options, and the delta from the shares owned by the executive.  
 
2. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 represents summary statistics of executive compensation and firm 
characteristics data from 1992 to 2018. The sample consists of 2,636 firms and 27,266 of 
total observations over sample period time of 1992 to 2018. Vega represents the dollar 
change in executive’s option wealth for a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility. Delta is 
the dollar change in executive’s option wealth for a 1% change in stock price. Consistent 
with prior literature (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006) vega and 
delta are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile level. Mean (median) vega is $119,000 
($45,000) and mean (median) delta is $576,000 ($194,000). R&D is expenditures on 
research and development scaled by total assets. Size represents the market value of the 
firm at fiscal year-end. Leverage is the aggregate of long-term and current liability, 
scaled by total assets. Tobin’s Q is a ratio of enterprise value to total assets. Free cash 
flow level is derived by operating income before depreciation net of capital expenditures, 
scaled by assets.  
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V. Empirical Strategy and Results  
 
1. Relationship between R&D spending and managerial incentive  
To test whether managers’ sensitivity to stock-return volatility incentivizes them 
to invest in R&D projects, I use a multivariate panel regression model to regress R&D 
spending scaled by total assets on vega.4 I also use a set of control variables that 
represents firm characteristics and affects R&D investment. I control for time-fixed 
effects to capture the influence of time-series trends. I also run two separate regressions, 
fixing for either firm or industry-fixed effects. I cluster my standard errors at a firm-level, 
controlling for time-series error correlation for each panel.   
                            R&Dit= a + b1Vegait+ b2Deltait+ b3Xit + eit                                        (4) 
where R&D is R&D expenses scaled by total assets, i and t represent firm and year, X is 
a vector of firm characteristic control variables (defined below), and e is an error term 
with the usual properties.   
 
1) Control Variables  
I use a set of control variables to capture the effect of omitted variable bias that 
would affect R&D spending. I choose these variables based on existing literature (e.g., 
Bushee, 1998; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2003; Coles et al., 2006). I first control for 
delta. Delta measures a manager’s incentive for a one percentage change in stock price. 
A manager’s wealth is tied to the stock price, which would decrease his willingness to 
bear risk (Knopf et al., 2002). Moreover, managers under invest in long-term intangible 
projects to meet short-term earnings expectations (e.g., Porter, 1992; Dechow and Sloan, 
                                                        
4 For firms that have missing R&D data, I set R&D equal to zero.   
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1991; Johnson and Pazderka, 1993; Chan et al., 1990). Therefore, I control for this risk-
aversion for changes in stock price to capture the pure effect of managerial incentive for 
risk-taking: vega. Second, I control for CAPEX (capital expenditures), scaled by total 
assets. Companies have a choice to invest in tangible and/or intangible investments. 
Tangible investments include capital expenditures on property, plant, and equipment, 
which are considered less risky than intangible projects such as R&D (Coles et al., 2006). 
Therefore, I include CAPEX to control for manager investment decision effect. Third, I 
add a Size variable, which is the logarithm of market value of equity, to control for a 
firm’s size effect. The R&D spending level will vary by firm size. I predict that Size will 
have a positive association with R&D spending, for large-companies would have more 
available funds to finance R&D investments. Fourth, I include Leverage to control for the 
effect of companies’ debt covenant incentive for risky projects and earnings management. 
Fifth, I follow Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) and add Tobin’s Q to capture the effect 
of marginal benefit-to-cost ratio for a new investment. I expect a positive link between 
Tobin’s Q and R&D intensity based on the prior literature (Hirschey and Weygandt, 
1985). Sixth, I include Sales Growth, a logarithm of the ratio of current year sales to 
previous year sales. Lastly, I include Free Cash Flow Level, which is the operating 
income before depreciation net of capital expenditures, scaled by assets. This variable 
captures the effect of near-term financing requirements (Bushee, 1998).  
 
2) Result  
Table 2 represents the regression result of R&D on CEO incentive. The estimated 
coefficients for vega are statistically significant at the both 5% and 1% level, when 
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controlled for either firm or industry-fixed effects.5 The vega coefficient is positive, 
which indicates that higher vega is associated with higher R&D expenditures. This 
finding suggests that as CEOs’ wealth is more sensitive to stock-return volatility, those 
CEOs are more incentivized to take on risky projects in R&D to increase firm risk, hence, 
boost their wealth in option portfolio. This regression result is statistically significant, 
after controlling for the negative and statistically significant effect of delta on R&D and 
other firm-characteristic control variables.  
The negative relationship between delta and R&D implies that as executives’ 
wealth sensitivity increases with stock price, executives take on less risky investments. 
Therefore, by controlling for delta, I find that managerial incentive for assuming risk 
explain firm’s R&D intensity, above and beyond the effect of delta. Under industry-fixed 
effect specifications, CAPEX, Size, and Leverage all have a negative and statistically 
significant association with R&D. The negative link between CAPEX and R&D explains 
that when CEOs decide to increase investments in capital expenditures, they reduce their 
willingness to take on R&D projects. In other words, CEOs make additional investment 
decisions that are either in R&D or CAPEX. One possible explanation for the negative 
relationship between Size and R&D is that small firms in development and growing stage 
assume the risk of R&D projects to build competitive advantage against their peers, 
seeking for more growth opportunities. Put differently, these small-sized firms see R&D 
as a long-term growth-enhancing investment. Leverage also negatively affects R&D 
spending, which suggests that higher debt covenant reduces managerial incentive for 
risky investments and earnings management. Lastly, the negative relationship between 
                                                        
5 Consistent with prior literatures (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Hanlon et al., 2003), I included all industries 
except financial services and utilities.  
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free cash flow level and R&D explains why companies cut R&D spending when they face 
more near-term financing requirements. 
For robustness check, I adjust vega and delta at the price-level in 2018. Appendix 
1 shows that the results are still statistically significant for both firm and industry-fixed 
effects, which suggest that even after adjusting for inflation, the effect of managerial 
incentive for risk-taking has a positive effect on firm’s decision on R&D investments.  
The results for firm-fixed effects are slightly weaker than those of the industry-
fixed effects. This is plausible when an individual company shows a relatively constant 
trend in vega over a sample time period. Therefore, firm-fixed effects weaken the 
explanatory power of vega on R&D when each firm has less variation in vega. Although 
the positive result of vega shows there is a statistically significant association between 
R&D spending and vega, there is little economic importance. The coefficients for both 
firm and industry-fixed effects are close to zero, which implies that the economic 
significance is minuscule. As seen in Table 1, under an industry-fixed effect, the vega 
coefficient of 0.0239 indicates that for every million-dollar change in an executive’s 
wealth for a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility, the R&D intensity level increases by 
0.0239%. Notice that in Table 1, the standard deviation for vega is $198,000. Therefore, 
on average, the effect of vega affecting the R&D intensity level would be much smaller 
than 0.0239%.  
 
2. Relationship between future operating income and vega and R&D  
To test if managerial incentive for accepting R&D projects translate to a 
realization in future earnings, I follow methodologies of Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and 
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Hanlon et al. (2003). Lev and Sougiannis (1996) establish that operating income (OIit) is 
a function of tangible (TAit) and intangible assets (IAit) of a firm i in year t:  
        OIit = f (TAit, IAit)                                                        (5) 
where OI is operating income scaled by sales, TA is tangible assets scaled by sales, IA is 
intangible assets, and i and t represent firm and year.  
Data for operating income and tangible assets is readily available on Compustat. 
Tangible assets include inventories and property, plant, and equipment. Hanlon et al. 
(2003) scale operating income and tangible assets by sales. However, I scale these 
variables by total assets because total assets are less volatile than sales, thereby yielding 
more stable measurements. R&D is included as intangible assets. However, a firm’s 
R&D intensity changes with managerial incentives when executives hold ESOs. Hanlon 
et al. (2003) estimate intangible capital using Black-Scholes ESO values, with the 
assumption that the dollar value of ESO would affect a firm’s decision on intangible 
investments. Hanlon et al. (2003) take this dollar value, not factoring in the sensitivity of 
an executive’s option portfolio to a change in stock price or stock-return volatility. They 
argue that they do this because their focus is not understanding how an executive’s 
incentive-intensity relates with operating income. Instead, they claim that they are 
interested in isolating the cost-benefit of ESOs on operating income, hence, they use the 
dollar value terms and not vega or delta. However, for my study, I use vega to account 
for the relationship between managerial incentive on R&D spending, which I establish in 
my first research question. Therefore, for intangible assets, I add R&D, vega, and an 
interactive term of vega and R&D to capture the effect of managerial incentives on R&D 
projects.  
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In my study, R&D is scaled by total assets. However, vega is not scaled and is in 
dollar terms because I assume that a dollar increase in an executive’s wealth is equivalent 
for all executives irrespective of firm size. To predict future operating income, I set 
operating income at time t+k (k = 0 – 5), and I take all the independent variables lagged by 
one year, t-1. R&D projects are long-term value-enhancing investments, which take time 
to bear fruit. To account for this characteristic, I regress operating income for year t+k (k = 0 
– 5) to find the effect of lagged R&D and managerial incentive on long-term future 
earnings. Therefore, I estimate future earnings as follows:  
   OIi,t+k (k = 0-5)  =  a + b1Vegai,t-1×R&Di,t-1 + b2Vegai,t-1 + b3R&Di,t-1 + b4TAi,t-1+ ei,t-1          (6) 
where OI is operating income, scaled by total assets; R&D is R&D spending, scaled by 
total assets; TA is tangible assets that include inventories and property, plant, and 
equipment, scaled by total assets; i and t represent firm and year, and e is an error term 
with the usual properties.   
I control for time-fixed effects to capture the influence of time-series trends. I also 
run two separate regressions, fixing for industry and firm -fixed effects. I cluster my 
standard errors at a firm-level, controlling for time-series error correlation for each panel.   
 
1) Correlation matrix  
Table 3 reports a correlation between variables for my baseline regression at t+k 
(k=0). Each variable is statistically and significantly associated with one another, except the 
association between future earnings and the interactive variable of vega and R&D. Vega 
is positively correlated with future operating income, which indicates that a manager’s 
incentive to take on risky projects increases with firm’s future earnings. This positive 
association is also shown with future earnings and tangible assets. However, a negative 
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correlation is shown between R&D and future operating income. This result suggests that 
investment in R&D does not translate to an immediate increase in future earnings. I 
expect this relationship to change its direction when future earnings are forecasted for a 
longer time horizon.  
 
2) Results  
Table 4 represents the regression result when controlled for firm-fixed effects. It 
shows that managerial incentive for R&D has a positive and statistically significant 
association with future operating income at year t+k (k = 0 – 3). For every t+k (k = 0 – 5), I 
restrict the sample to CEOs that survived at year t+k (k = 0 – 5). The outcome proposes that 
when managers, who are incentivized to augment their wealth by increasing firm risk, 
invest in R&D projects, this investment decision translates to an increase in future 
earnings. However, under firm-fixed effects specifications, the positive value of R&D 
spending is not realized after year t+3. Nonetheless, when controlling for industry-fixed 
effects, the association between future earnings and managerial incentive on R&D 
investment is positive and statistically significant for all years throughout t+k (k = 0 – 5), as 
shown in Table 5.  
There is a noticeable difference between the magnitudes of the variables when 
controlling for firm or industry-fixed effects, respectively. For example, the coefficient 
for Vegai,t-1´R&Di,t-1 under firm-fixed effects is in the range of 0.22 to 0.55, whereas 
under industry-fixed effects, it is in the range of 1.35 to 1.61. In other words, when 
controlling for industry-fixed effects, the interactive term of vega and R&D affects future 
earnings by approximately three to six-times greater than the model for firm-fixed effects 
specifications. That is to say, when I take each firm-specific characteristic into account, 
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the effect of managerial incentive on R&D investment gets smaller, compared to when I 
lump the firms together by industries. Also, the results for industry-fixed effects show 
higher statistical significance than that of firm-fixed effects because managerial incentive 
for R&D is less variant over time for firm-fixed effects than it is for industry-fixed 
effects.6  
Another noticeable difference between firm and industry-fixed effect is the 
coefficient sign of vega and its statistical significance. When controlled for industry-fixed 
effects, vega shows a positive association with future earnings and loses its significance 
at year t+4. However, under firm-fixed effects, the results for vega and earnings show a 
negative association and present a statistical significance at year t+k (k = 1 – 5). Under 
industry-fixed effects, R&D has a negative relation to future earnings and has statistical 
significance for all projected years. However, when controlled for firm-fixed effects, 
R&D negatively associates with future earnings for firm-fixed effects, but the statistical 
significance is only shown at year t and t+2.  
One plausible explanation for this difference in coefficient signs and statistical 
significance is that by controlling for industry-fixed effects, the model lumps firms by 
their industries and does not control for omitted variable bias that each firm has in the 
model. Therefore, by forcing a firm-fixed effect specification, I control for factors that 
are unobserved or unmeasured and vary across firms but not over time. Although firm-
fixed effects control for these factors at the lowest-level, I am cautious about concluding 
                                                        
6 I have a choice to use firm or industry-fixed effect to test my model. The data has 2,461 unique firms and 
10 industries. It is tempting to use firm-fixed effect over industry-fixed effect because by controlling for 
each 2,461 firm the model, it would present a higher explanatory power. However, there is a danger to this 
approach, especially when my parameter of interest is not time-variant at the firm level. By being firm-
specific, I am allowing the result to lose its statistical significance. Therefore, for comparison, I present and 
analyze results for both firm and industry-fixed effect specifications.   
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that the firm-fixed effect model represents my empirical study better than an industry-
fixed effect regression, especially when my parameter of interest is less time-variant. This 
is because by being firm-specific, I am allowing the firm-fixed effect to capture any 
elements and control for any persistent firm-level differences, which causes the result to 
lose its statistical significance and not best represent my study.7 For this reason, I am less 
concerned that the coefficient signs and statistical significance for the firm-fixed model 
does not align with the industry-fixed model.  
 
3) Robustness Check  
Table 6 represents regression results and controls for firm-fixed effects; Table 7 
shows regression results that control for industry-fixed effects. Both results correct for 
survivorship bias and have a balanced panel data. The final sample for both regressions 
has 1,663 firms and 14,084 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2013, with no missing 
data. The drop of 798 firms in the sample size from year t to year t+5 can be explained by 
changes in executive positions, primarily by CEOs leaving firms after year t+k  (k =1 – 5). 
Therefore, I am restricting my sample to a selective subset of tenured-CEOs. I define 
tenured-CEOs as people who stay with the firm for five-years.8 
When controlling for industry-fixed effects, the results show that the interactive 
variable of vega and R&D, which measures a manager’s incentive for taking on R&D 
                                                        
7 I follow the earnings function established my Lev and Sougiannis (1996), which only includes a set of 
independent variables such as tangible and intangible assets. Therefore, in my model, I am aware that I did 
not include control variables that might affect both the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, it 
is possible that the firm-fixed effects are controlling for any persistent firm-level difference, which lowers 
the overall significance of my model. I can use instrumental variables and two-stage least squares 
regression to correct for endogeneity bias. However, since my independent variables are all lagged by one-
year, whereas my dependent variable is set at t+k (k=0), I am less concerned about the simultaneity bias in my 
study.   
8 Equilar Inc. (2018) published a study that shows five-year is an average tenure for CEOs at S&P 500 
companies. 
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projects, is positively associated with future earnings for all year t+k (k = 0 – 5). This 
association is statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that managers 
accept R&D projects to raise firm risk, and these investments are realized in future 
earnings. That is to say, a manager’s motivation to increase his wealth by assuming risk 
in R&D projects, positively impacts the firm’s earnings.  
 However, under firm-fixed effects, this relationship is only statistically 
significant at year t+3. This finding implies that tenured-managers take on R&D projects 
that might increase their wealth but not the firm’s future earnings. Put differently, these 
tenured-CEOs are more incentivized to accept R&D projects to increase firm risk — 
thereby raising their portfolio wealth — rather than the purpose of generating long-term 
value to the firm. Also, the negative sign of Vegai,t-1 under firm-fixed effects specification 
indicates that the sole effect of a manger’s decision to raise firm risk to augment one’s 
personal wealth, leads to a fall in future earnings. In other words, their actions to increase 
firm risk, other than investing in R&D, such as taking more leverage and investing in 
other risky projects, negatively impact firm’s earnings. This finding is statistically 
significant at year t+k (k = 2 – 5), which proposes that this effect is more prevalent and 
significant at a longer-time horizon. The difference in statistical significance for firm and 
industry-fixed effects arises because the interactive term of vega and R&D is less variant 
under the firm-fixed effect than it is for the industry-fixed effect. Therefore, the firm-
fixed effect weakens the explanatory power of Vegai,t-1×R&Di,t-1 on future earnings.  
To understand what might have possibly caused the significance to fall when the 
data has a balanced panel of CEOs, who are in their executive roles consecutively for 5-
years, I run a regression on the sample of CEOs who only survived during their first-year 
in term. If I find a positive and statistical significance of Vegai,t-1×R&Di,t-1 on future 
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earnings, I can conclude that it is this subset of CEOs who did not survive in year t+5 that 
drives the statistical insignificance in a balanced panel data. However, as presented in 
Appendix 2, I find that there is no statistical significance between managerial incentive 
for risk taking in R&D and future earnings. This result implies that the managerial 
incentive for this selective group of CEOs, who stayed with the firm for only one-year, 
does not affect firm earnings when they assume risk in R&D projects. Therefore, it is the 
combined effect of both CEOs who did and did not survive at year t+5 that drives the loss 
in statistical significance in a balanced sample. That is to say, by having a balanced panel 
data, I am restricting my sample to a selective group of tenured-CEOs and leaving out a 
particular group of CEOs who stayed with the firm for only one year. Moreover, I narrow 
my sample to CEOs who maintain their executive positions for five-years, which is a 
reasonable, yet arbitrary number. Therefore, for this empirical context, I am cautious not 
to conclude that using a restrictive balanced panel infers better significance of the 
association between managerial incentive on R&D projects and its realization into a 
firm’s future earnings than a non-balanced panel.   
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VI. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I address two research questions. First, I test if managerial incentive 
for risk-taking increases a firm’s R&D expenditure. I derive vega to measure managerial 
incentive, and vega is a dollar change in ESO for a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility. 
I find this relationship to be positive and statistically significant at both 5% and 1% 
levels, when I control for either firm or industry-fixed effects. This result suggests that 
CEOs who get compensated with stock options assume the risk of R&D investments 
because they expect this investment decision will increase stock-return volatility, hence, 
boosting their option portfolio wealth.  
With this finding, I do a second study, which assesses if managerial incentive for 
accepting R&D projects translates to an increase in future earnings. Earnings is a function 
of tangible and intangible assets (Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Hanlon et al. 2003). Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) find that R&D expenditures boost subsequent earnings because they 
are value-enhancing investments. Hanlon et al. (2003) expand this literature by predicting 
intangible assets with Black-Scholes ESO value in dollar terms. Since I establish that 
managerial incentive for risk-taking increases firm’s R&D from my first study, I include 
vega into the earnings function, factoring in managerial incentive for assuming risks. I 
find that as CEOs are more incentivized to increase firm risk by taking on R&D projects, 
subsequent earnings increase. In other words, a CEO’s motivation to raise his stock 
option portfolio value by taking on R&D projects leads to an increase in the firm’s future 
operating income. This suggests that R&D is a value-enhancing investment to companies. 
This outcome is statistically significant for all years t+k (k = 0-5), when controlled for 
industry-fixed effects.   
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However, for firm-fixed effects, the significance disappears at t+4 and t+5. In other 
words, the realization of R&D investment to future earnings is not prevalent at a longer 
time horizon when R&D decisions are made by incentivized managers. I re-run this 
model using a balanced panel, restricting my data to tenured-CEOs for robustness check. 
Tenured-CEOs are people who stayed with the firm as CEOs for five years. I find loss in 
statistical significance in all years except t+3, when controlled for firm-fixed effects. This 
finding proposes that the R&D projects accepted by tenured-managers boost only the 
firm’s risk, not future earnings. That is to say, their choice in R&D projects only increase 
their wealth and not their firm’s wealth.  
Throughout my study, I control for either firm or industry-fixed effects. For my 
first research question, I discover that my results are statistically significant under both 
conditions. However, for my second study, in which I test the ability of managerial 
incentive to realize R&D into future earnings, I find the firm-fixed effect model to have 
less explanatory power than that of an industry-fixed effect model. This is because the 
cross-term variable of vega and R&D is less-variant over time. In other words, the firm-
fixed effect weakens the explanatory power. 
There are possible areas for future research within this topic. First, depending on 
manager portfolio diversification, their incentive to increase stock-return volatility might 
change. In other words, CEOs whose portfolio is heavily ESO-based would react more 
strongly to changes in stock-return volatility than those whose is not. Therefore, 
examining how managerial incentive for R&D investment differ when accounting for this 
aspect could be one area for further research. Also, testing how managerial incentive 
differs by industry or by size of a firm is another area for future research. Chan et al. 
(1990) find that technology firms view R&D as long-term value-enhancing investment. 
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For this reason, CEOs in technology might behave differently to R&D, and their ability to 
translate R&D to future earnings might vary by industries. Therefore, for future research, 
I can conduct the same study for each industry and examine which has the highest and 
strongest managerial incentive for R&D and its realization on future earnings. I can also 
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Tables1: Summary statistics of executive compensation and firm characteristics  
 







CEO characteristics      
Vega ($000s) 119 198 13 45 130 
Delta ($000s) 576 1227 75 194 526 
      
Firm characteristics       
R&D 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.05 
CAPEX 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 
Size  1.99 0.24 1.85 2.00 2.15 
Leverage 0.23 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.34 
Tobin's Q 1.59 1.70 0.75 1.20 1.92 
Sales Growth (%) 0.13 0.76 -0.01 0.07 0.18 
Free Cash Flow Level 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.13 
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Table 2: Relationship between R&D and Vega    
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES R&D R&D 
   
Vega ($mm) 0.00570** 0.0235*** 
 (2.276) (6.084) 
Delta ($mm) -0.000713 -0.00257*** 
 (-1.597) (-3.325) 
CAPEX 0.00527*** -0.291*** 
 (3.403) (-11.07) 
Size -0.0359 -0.00276*** 
 (-1.415) (-3.456) 
Leverage -0.00719*** -0.0417*** 
 (-4.516) (-4.552) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0201*** 0.0166*** 
 (-3.290) (6.050) 
Sales growth  -0.000433 0.00287 
 (-0.516) (1.418) 
Free Cash Flow Level -0.144*** -0.294*** 
 (-4.583) (-8.791) 
Constant 0.101*** 0.0862** 
 (10.74) (2.528) 
Time fixed effects YES YES  
Firm fixed effects  YES NO 
2-digit SIC Controls NO YES  
Observations 22,029 22,029 
Number of firms 2,276  
R-squared 0.156  0.405 
   
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
 
 OIit Vegai,t-1×R&Di,t-1 Vegai,t-1 R&Di,t-1 TAi,t-1 
OIit 1     
Vegai,t-1×R&Di,t-1 0.0123 1    
Vegai,t-1 0.116*** 0.478*** 1   
R&Di,t-1 -0.344*** 0.384*** -0.0215*** 1  
TAi,t-1 0.0189** -0.204*** -0.0802*** -0.332*** 1 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Relationship between managerial incentive for R&D investment and future 
earnings, controlled for firm-fixed effects  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OIi,t OIi,t+1 OIit+2 OIi,t+3 OIi,t+4 OIi,t+5 
       
Vegai,t-1´R&Di,t-1 0.549*** 0.462** 0.494** 0.569** 0.289 0.220 
 (2.818) (2.167) (2.172) (2.451) (1.103) (0.840) 
Vegai,t-1 -0.0107 -0.0181** -0.0223*** -0.0312*** -0.0335*** -0.0367*** 
 (-1.542) (-2.541) (-2.883) (-3.761) (-3.557) (-3.609) 
R&Di,t-1 -0.197** -0.0519 -0.0600 -0.163** -0.0540 -0.0272 
 (-2.359) (-0.637) (-0.911) (-2.320) (-0.814) (-0.173) 
TAi,t-1 -0.0354** -0.0156 -0.00393 0.00192 -0.00617 -0.00931 
 (-2.506) (-0.955) (-0.238) (0.116) (-0.317) (-0.533) 
Constant 0.163*** 0.139*** 0.125*** 0.110*** 0.0932*** 0.0842** 
 (9.119) (5.980) (5.756) (3.907) (3.646) (2.498) 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm-fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 24,625 22,164 19,876 17,780 15,854 14,084 
R-squared 0.030 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.013 0.011 
Number of firms 2,461 2,289 2,097 1,926 1,770 1,663 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Relationship between managerial incentive for R&D investment and future 
earnings, controlled for industry-fixed effects  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OIi,t OIi,t+1 OIit+2 OIi,t+3 OIi,t+4 OIi,t+5 
       
Vegai,t-1´R&Di,t-1 1.355*** 1.380*** 1.476*** 1.613*** 1.561*** 1.519*** 
 (7.944) (8.055) (8.243) (7.598) (6.694) (6.138) 
Vegai,t-1 0.0266*** 0.0256*** 0.0218*** 0.0156* 0.0145 0.0138 
 (3.448) (3.256) (2.761) (1.848) (1.593) (1.413) 
R&Di,t-1 -0.783*** -0.747*** -0.739*** -0.757*** -0.708*** -0.674*** 
 (-15.02) (-13.12) (-11.94) (-9.722) (-8.719) (-7.645) 
TAi,t-1 -0.0431*** -0.0358*** -0.0347*** -0.0356*** -0.0313** -0.0298** 
 (-4.168) (-3.372) (-3.314) (-3.400) (-2.517) (-2.240) 
Constant 0.0619* 0.0551 0.0447 0.0834 0.0717 0.0597 
 (1.754) (1.370) (1.022) (1.560) (1.326) (1.012) 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 24,625 22,164 19,876 17,780 15,854 14,084 
R-squared 0.181 0.164 0.157 0.158 0.141 0.131 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Relationship between managerial incentive for R&D investment and future 
earnings, controlled for firm-fixed effects (N = 14,084) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OIi,t OIi,t+1 OIit+2 OIi,t+3 OIi,t+4 OIi,t+5 
       
Vegai,t-1´R&Di,t-1 0.161 0.0355 0.262 0.498** 0.229 0.220 
 (0.998) (0.189) (1.251) (2.125) (0.972) (0.841) 
Vegai,t-1 -0.00951 -0.0113 -0.0192** -0.0348*** -0.0342*** -0.0367*** 
 (-1.175) (-1.438) (-2.374) (-3.940) (-3.694) (-3.610) 
R&Di,t-1 -0.0974 0.138* 0.0853 -0.128 0.0148 -0.0272 
 (-1.142) (1.830) (1.390) (-1.537) (0.278) (-0.173) 
TAi,t-1 -0.0153 -0.00736 -0.00164 -0.00664 -0.0163 -0.00939 
 (-0.775) (-0.345) (-0.0786) (-0.353) (-0.727) (-0.537) 
Constant 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.0949*** 0.0843** 
 (6.952) (5.242) (5.513) (4.145) (3.749) (2.499) 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm-fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 
R-squared 0.027 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.013 0.011 
Number of firms 1,663 1,663 1,663 1,663 1,663 1,663 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 7: Relationship between managerial incentive for R&D investment and future 
earnings, controlled for industry-fixed effects (N = 14,084) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OIi,t OIi,t+1 OIit+2 OIi,t+3 OIi,t+4 OIi,t+5 
       
Vega i,t-1´R&Di,t-1 1.495*** 1.380*** 1.521*** 1.667*** 1.525*** 1.519*** 
 (7.079) (6.753) (7.480) (6.960) (6.155) (6.137) 
Vegai,t-1 0.0162* 0.0201** 0.0154* 0.00901 0.0122 0.0139 
 (1.728) (2.161) (1.805) (0.989) (1.293) (1.415) 
R&Di,t-1 -0.758*** -0.678*** -0.693*** -0.739*** -0.686*** -0.674*** 
 (-10.39) (-9.975) (-11.27) (-9.078) (-8.068) (-7.645) 
TAi,t-1 -0.0343** -0.0254** -0.0263** -0.0357*** -0.0323** -0.0298** 
 (-2.501) (-1.987) (-2.361) (-3.231) (-2.498) (-2.240) 
Constant 0.155*** 0.0768** 0.0714** 0.0685** 0.0538 0.0388 
 (4.225) (2.402) (2.095) (2.063) (1.179) (0.750) 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 14,084 
R-squared 0.174 0.150 0.154 0.162 0.143 0.131 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 1: Relationship between R&D and Vega, adjusted for price-level in 2018 
Appendices 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES R&D R&D 
   
Vega ($mm) 0.00592*** 0.0192*** 
 (2.634) (5.762) 
Delta ($mm) -0.000537 -0.00193*** 
 (-1.437) (-3.188) 
CAPEX 0.00533*** -0.299*** 
 (3.217) (-10.91) 
Size -0.0429 -0.00280*** 
 (-1.570) (-3.355) 
Leverage -0.00766*** -0.0420*** 
 (-4.473) (-4.331) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0233*** 0.0162*** 
 (-3.402) (5.726) 
Sales growth  -0.000407 0.00271 
 (-0.510) (1.436) 
Free Cash Flow Level -0.152*** -0.295*** 
 (-4.600) (-8.384) 
Constant 0.101*** 0.0862** 
 (10.74) (2.528) 
Time fixed effects YES YES  
Firm fixed effects  YES NO 
2-digit SIC Controls NO YES  
Observations 22,029 22,029 
Number of firms 2,276  
R-squared 0.156  0.405 
   
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Time fixed effect YES 
CEO fixed effect YES 
Observations 10,542 
Number of firms 2,461 
R-squared 0.026 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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